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Abstract?Decision analysis of the ultimatum game based on the hybrid model was car-
ried out. The hybrid model of social orientation is composed of two major decision atti-
tudes, that is, social orientation and equalityseeking. It is an expansion of the classical
geometrical model of social orientation, but it contains equalityseeking motive, which is
considered to play an influential role in the decision making process in the ultimatum
games. According to the hybrid model, the decision making of a person is described by
two parameters, ?M?social orientation?and a?weight to?M?. It was clearly shown how
the decision making by both the allocator and the recipient in the ultimatum games can
be explained and predicted by the hybrid model. Furthermore, it was also made clear that
it captures the salient feature of the decision making by the allocators and the recipients
found in the empirical studies of the ultimatum games. It is expected to promote the devel-
opment of research on people’s decisionmaking behavior, not only in the ultimatum games
but also other decision problems in the interdependent situations.
Key Words?social orientation, equality seeking, ultimatum game, decision making, de-
composed game, matrix game.
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The geometrical model of social orientation
?Griesinger & Livingstone, 1973?is an expres-
sion of the tendency how a person takes the
other persons interest into consideration com-
pared with his?her own interest, when he?she
has to make a choice in the interdependent
situations. The social orientation of a particular
person is expressed by the orientation ? in
the 2 dimensional XY space, as shown in
Fig.1. Axis X and Y represent persons own
and others payoff respectively. An alternative
of choice is expressed as a point?xi, yi?in X
Y space. A person is supposed to keep a par-
ticular orientation ? uniformly in this space.
When a person has to choose one from among
several alternatives?points?in XY space, he
/she is supposed to choose the alternative that
gives the highest value of mi, according to the
geometrical model. The value of mi is given by
the next equality.
mi = xi cosθ + yi sinθ 
cosθ and sinθ are the weights given to two
persons payoffs. Variable mi can be inter-
preted as the subjective values of the given al-
ternatives for a person who has to make a
choice. Furthermore, equality  gives a
straight line in XY space, and any point (xi,
yi ) on this line gives the same value of mi.
Then the line given by equality  can be re-
garded as an indifference curve. Further, this
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indifference curve, which is straight in reality,
is perpendicular to axis M. Since, mi is deter-
mined unambiguously by the social orientation
? of a person, social orientation ? can be in-
terpreted to represent the choice attitude of
a person.
???? ??????????? ????? ?? ?????? ???????????
? can take any numerical value, therefore
the geometrical model can express a variety
of social orientations, and some of them are
called altruistic, cooperative, individualistic,
competitive, or aggressive orientation. However,
the geometrical model does not contain the
choice attitude based on equalityseeking mo-
tive, which is considered to play an influential
role in the peoples decision making in the in-
terdependent situations, in general. A person,
who makes a choice based on equalityseeking,
is considered to choose the alternative that
minimizes di?the absolute difference between
the payoffs to two persons?, which is given by
the next equality.

Obviously, equality  does not include this
choice attitude. However, decision making
based on equalityseeking can be described by
two equalities as described bellow. According
to equalityseeking motive, a person is sup-
posed to choose the alternative giving the
highest value of mi, which is given by the fol-
lowing equalities. When the given alternatives
meet xi?yi, mi is given by

and, when xi?yi, mi is given by

In other words, people are supposed to acti-
vate two different social orientation systems,
depending on which area the alternatives of
choice are situated in XY space, either the
upper left area or the lower right. That is, a
person activate ?? ?
?
??????when xi?yi,
and ??? ?
?
??????when xi?yi. We call
the decision attitude described by equalities
 and  the geometrical model of equality
seeking, in this paper.
? ??? ?????? ????? ?? ?????? ???????????
The hybrid model of social orientation?Doi,
2007?hypothesizes that two different decision
attitudes discussed above are activated simul-
taneously. This model can be described by a
linear combination of two geometrical models.
The subjective values mi of alternatives?xi, yi?
of choice are described either by equalities 
and , or by  and , depending on which
area the alternatives are situated in XY space.
When xi?yi, mi is given by the equality
shown below.
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When xi?yi, mi is given by the equality 
shown below.

The first terms in equalities  and  are
identical and express the decision attitude
based on the social orientation θ M of a person
?θ M is used instead of θ in order to distin-
guish between the geometrical model and the
hybrid model?. It is supposed that the same
value of θ M is activated uniformly for any
given alternative of choice independently of xi
?yi or xi?yi. The second terms are different
between  and  and express the decision
attitude based on equality seeking. A person is
supposed to utilize equality  or  to make
a choice, depending on whether the given al-
ternative meets xi?yi or xi?yi. Variable a in
the equalities takes numerical values between
0 and 1, and it expresses how strongly or
weekly equality seeking motive affects decision
making of a person. When a = 1, both equali-
ties  and  will become

Equality  is equivalent to equality , that is,
the hybrid model is identical with the classical
geometrical model of social orientation. When
a = 0, equalities  and  will become the fol-
lowing equalities.


Equalities  and  are equivalent to  and
, then, the hybrid model is identical with the
geometrical model of equalityseeking, when a
= 0.
When 0?a?1, a person is supposed to make
a choice based on partly social orientation and
partly equalityseeking, simultaneously. The
more the value of a is getting closer to 1, the
more decision making of a person is affected
by social orientation θ M. Contrarily, the more
the value of a is getting closer to 0, the more
the decision making is affected by equality
seeking. Therefore, the hybrid model is consid-
ered to be a genuine integration of the geo-
metrical model of social orientation and the
geometrical model of equality seeking.
Equalities  and  can be transformed into
the equalities 	 and 
, respectively.
	


Obviously, these two equalities express differ-
ent straight lines, and they can be regarded
as indifference curves. The lines by 	 give in-
difference curves in the area satisfying xi?yi,
and the lines by 
 in xi?yi. As discussed ear-
lier, the indifference curve  is perpendicular
to axis M that is given by social orientation.
Then, it seems reasonable to assume that
there should be such social orientations that
are perpendicular to the two lines given by
	 and 
 . If so, the hybrid model is inter-
preted to suppose that a person activate two
different social orientation systems, depending
on whether xi?yi or xi?yi. Assigning θ L to the
social orientation and li to the subjective val-
ues of alternatives of choice when xi?yi, and
θ N and ni when xi?yi, the indifference curves
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
Since equalities  and  correspond to
equalities  and , li should be equal to mi
given by  , and ni should be equal to mi
given by  . Equalities  and  are de-
scribed by θ M and a , whereas  by θ L and
 by θ N. Thus, it is possible to interpret that
a person owns basic social orientation θ M but
it is modified by a differently depending on
either xi?yi or xi?yi. θ L and θ N can be re-
garded as the social orientation θ M modified
by a .
According to the geometrical model given
by , the decision making of a person is de-
termined based on his?her θ?social orienta-
tion?, that is, the choice behavior reflects un-
ambiguously ones social orientation. Then, it is
possible to assess θ based on the the choice
behaviors for a variety of alternatives. Such
method to assess θ was theoretically derived
from equality , and it was properly validated
?Doi, 1984, 1990, 1994?. However, the expres-
sion of the hybrid model by  and  indi-
cates that decision making of a person is de-
termined by both θ M (basic social orientation)
and a (weight to θ M). That is, the choice be-
havior does not reflects directly either θ M or
a . Therefore, θ M and a cannot be assessed
based on the choice behaviors of a person.
However, according to  and , it is possible
to assess θ L and θ N based on the choice be-
haviors of a person by the method derived
from equality  . Since, equalities  and 
have to correspond to equalities  and  re-
spectively, the following equalities can be de-
rived from them.

	
Further, equalities  and 	 can be trans-
formed into the following equalities respec-
tively.



The right terms in equality 
 and  should
be equivalent. Then, we will obtain the follow-
ing equality.

The right term in equality  contains only θ L
and θ N. Then, tanθ M can be calculated if θ L
and θ N were obtained. Accordingly, basic social
orientation θ M can be obtained by the next
equality.
θ M = arctanθ M 
If θ M or tanθ M was assessed, then a will be
obtained by either equality 
 or . When θ L
?θ N?θ M were obtained, we will get a = 1.
On the other hand, when θ L=????and θ N?
J Psychol Sci ??????
????
)sin(cos)sin(cos
MMiMMii
yaxam θθθθ +⋅=+⋅=
m
aa
x
aa
aa
y
MM
M
−+⋅
+
−+⋅
+−⋅
−=
1sin2
2
1sin2
1cos2
θθ
θ
m
aa
x
aa
aa
y
MM
M
+−⋅
+
+−⋅
−+⋅
−=
1sin2
2
1sin2
1cos2
θθ
θ
????were obtained, we will get a = 0. There-
fore, a seems to express how θ L and θ N are
similar to or different from each other.
Our analysis so far has not included the alter-
natives satisfying xi=yi. However formally, the
hybrid model described by  and  can be
applied to those alternatives satisfying xi=yi.
Two equalities  and  give the same value
of mi for those alternatives satisfying xi= yi.
That is,

It is reasonable to say that a person can make
his?her choice for any combination of alterna-
tives in XY space. He?she should choose the
alternative that gives the highest mi, applying
? or  depending on which area each al-
ternative is situated in the space. The indiffer-
ence curves given by  and  are polygonal
lines. It is described by the combination of the
following two lines.

when xi?yi, in XY space, and

when xi<yi, in the space. Fig.2 shows the indif-
ference curves that are given when a=0.5 and
θ M=???. As previously discussed, any point on
the same indifference curve gives the same
value of mi. The bended point of the indiffer-
ence curve moves on axis E . The higher the
bended point moves to, the higher value of mi
the indifference curve gives.
???? ???????????? ?????? ????? ?? ??? ??????
????? ???? a ??? ??? θ M ????
? ??????????? ???????? ?? ??? ????????
???????? ? ?????? ?? ??? ?????????
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Ultimatum game is a unique decision mak-
ing problem where equalityseeking motive is
considered to play an influential role in the de-
cision making process of a person. Then, how
well can the hybrid model of social orientation,
which contains equalityseeking motive, explain
the decision making of a person in the ultima-
tum games? The ultimatum game is a decision
situation where two persons are given a cer-
tain amount of payoff, but they have to divide
it between them. However, they cannot negoti-
ate over the allocation of the given payoff. The
behavioral choices given to the two persons
are quite different. One person called the allo-
cator has to propose the allocation of the
given payoff. The other person called the re-
cipient has to decide if he?she accepts the pro-
posed allocation or not. If the recipient ac-
cepted it, both he?she and the allocator can
????????? ??????
????
get some payoff according to the proposed al-
location. If the recipient refused to accept it,
neither can get any payoff. The given payoff
has to be simply confiscated.
The ultimatum game can be expressed geo-
metrically in XY space as shown in Fig.3.
The proposed allocation is expressed as one
point on the line segment AB, where the sum
of the payoff to the allocator and the recipient
is constant. Point A represents the allocation
where 100% to the allocator and nothing to
the recipient. Point E represents the allocation
where 50% to the two equally, and Point B,
nothing to the allocator and 100% to the re-
cipient. Point O, the origin of this space, repre-
sents the payoff to the two when the recipient
refused the proposed allocation. What the allo-
cator has to do in this space is to choose one
point from the line segment AB. If the alloca-
tor chose point P, then the recipient has to de-
cide if he/she accept P or not, that is, to
choose P or O, in the space. According to the
hybrid model of social orientation, the decision
making of the allocator and the recipient can
be analyzed as follows.
???? ??????????? ?????????? ?? ??? ???? ????
?????
??? ???????? ??????? ?? ??? ?????????
The decision making of the recipient can be
predicted by the indifference curve given by
recipients θ L and θ N. The indifference curve
that is passing through the origin O divides
the whole XY space into the two areas. The
recipient should accept the proposed allocation
if it is situated in the upper right area from
this indifference curve, and he?she should re-
ject it if it is situated in the lower left area.
The upper right area can be called the accept-
able area, and the lower left area, the re-
jectable area. Therefore, the indifference curve
passing thorough the origin O can be regarded
as the criterion to judge if the proposed alloca-
tion is acceptable or rejectable. We call this in-
difference curve FID?fundamental indifference
curve?. θ L and θ N that determine FID corre-
spond unambiguously to a and θ M of the re-
cipient, as analyzed previously. Therefore, deci-
sion making of the recipient in the ultimatum
game can be predicted explicitly, if his?her θ M
and a are given.
FID varies according to the combination of
θ L and θ N. Three different examples of FID
are shown in Fig.4 to Fig.6, where the accept-
able area is grayed. FID shown in Fig.4 is
given when θ L????and θ N???. The entire
line segment AB is included in the acceptable
area. Then, the recipient should accept any al-
location proposed by the allocater, even if it
was point A where all the payoff goes to the
allocator and nothing is left for the recipient.
While on the other hand, the acceptable line
segment is much shorter in Fig.5, which is
given when θ L????and θ N???. The line seg-
ment AC is not included in the acceptable
area. Then the recipient should accept the pro-
posed allocation if it was on the line segment
CB, and should reject it if on the line seg-
J Psychol Sci ??????
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ment AC. The recipient in this case will re-
fuse to accept point A, but accept point B
where all the payoff goes to the recipient and
nothing is left for the allocator. Further, the
acceptable line segment is even shorter in
Fig.6, which is given when θ L????and θ N?
??. Only the line segment CD is acceptable.
Then, the recipient should refuse the proposed
allocation if it was on the rejectable line seg-
ment AC or DB. Hence, the recipient is sup-
posed to reject both point A and B.
Point C and D, which location is determined
by FID, reflects the recipients θ L and θ N.
That is, if the location of point C and D were
clarified experimentally, then the recipients a
and θ M, can be assessed by equalities  and
either  or . Giving the recipient various ul-
timatum games which allocation proposals cor-
respond to the various points on the line seg-
ment AB, if the pattern of the accepted
points is congruent with the line segment C
D shown in Fig.6, the recipients θ L and θ N
can be assessed. Then the recipients a and θ M
can be derived from them. If this pattern is
congruent with the line segment shown in
Fig.4 or Fig.5, only either one of θ L or θ N can
be assessed. Thus, the recipients a and θ M
cannot be assessed. It is concluded that recipi-
ents θ M and a can be assessed based on his?
her decision making in the ultimatum games,
only when his?her pattern of the accepted
points meets the condition, that is, θ L????and
θ N???.
??? ???????? ??????? ?? ??? ?????????
The unique aspect of ultimatum games is
that either the allocator or the recipient can-
not get any payoff if the recipient refused the
proposed allocation. The assignment for the al-
locator is to choose one point from the line
???? ??? ?? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???? ???
?? ??????????????
???? ??? ?? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???? ???
?? ???? ??????????
???? ??? ?? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???? ???
?? ???? ??????????
????????? ??????
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segment AB as the allocation proposal. But, it
has to be accepted by the recipient. Therefore,
it is extremely important for the allocator to
confirm if the point that he?she has chosen is
situated on the acceptable line segment for the
recipient or not. If the chosen point by the al-
locator was situated on the rejectable line seg-
ment for the recipient, he?she will not get any
payoff. As previously discussed, whether a par-
ticular point is acceptable or not, is determined
by FIC that reflects recipients θ L and θ N, or
recipients a and θ M. Then, it is crucial for the
allocator to determine the allocation proposal
how he?she perceives recipients FIC, or more
specifically his?her a and θ M. If the assessment
of the recipients FIC were made, the accept-
able line segment of the recipient can be de-
termined. Then he?she has to choose one point
from the acceptable line segment, which gives
the highest subjective value mi, according to
his?her own indifference curve system that is
given by his?her own θ M and a. If his?her per-
ception of the recipients FIC is reasonable, the
recipient will accept his?her proposal of the al-
location, and he?she will obtain the maximum
satisfaction. Then the both allocators own θ M
and a and his?her perception of the recipients
FIC, that is θ M and a , are crucial in order to
explain the decision making by the allocator in
the ultimatum games.
If the perceived FIC by the allocator was
similar to the one shown in Fig.6, then he?she
has to choose one point from the line segment
CD. Theoretical analysis predicts that the allo-
cator should choose from among three points
C, D, and E, as the allocation proposal, accord-
ing to his?her own indifference curve system.
Fig.7 to Fig.9 show three examples of the allo-
cators indifference curves. Three indifference
curves that pass through point C, E, and B are
drawn in each Fig. The indifference curves in
Fig.7 are likely obtained when a is closer to
0, that is when equalityseeking motive plays
influential role in decision making process. As
previously stated, the higher the bended point
of the indifference curve locates on axis E, the
higher value of mi the indifference curve gives.
Therefore, the indifference curve passing
through point M gives the highest mi in Fig.7.
The Indifference curves shown in Fig.8 and
Fig. 9 are likely obtained when a is rather
closer to 1, that is when equalityseeking mo-
tive does not influence decision making proc-
ess much. Accordingly, the bended angle of
the indifference curves is much shallower than
those in Fig.7. The highest mi is given by the
indifference curve passing through point C in
Fig.8, and point D in Fig.9. Therefore, the allo-
cation proposal by the allocator can be pre-
dicted if both his/her own θ M and a and his?
her perception of the recipients FIC are given.
The allocators perception of recipients FIC
can be obtained fairly easily, simply asking the
allocator to judge whether various points from
the line segment AB would be accepted by
the recipient or not. However, the chosen point
by the allocator does not reflect his?her own
θ M and a directly. Variety of θ M and a leads
the allocator to the one from among point C,
E, or D on the acceptable line segment. There-
fore, it is not possible to assess θ M and a
based on his?her decision making in the ulti-
matum games.
? ????? ???????
The analysis we have conducted reveals how
the decision making by both the allocator and
the recipient in the ultimatum games can be
explained and predicted by the hybrid model
J Psychol Sci ??????
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of social orientation. The recipients decision
making can be explained clearly and predicted
if his?her θ M and a were known, and the allo-
cators decision making if his/her θ M and a
and his?her perception of the recipients FIC
?or θ M and a?were given. However, our analy-
sis also reveals that there are limitations to as-
sess θ M and a of the allocator and the recipi-
ent based on their choice behaviors in the ulti-
matum games. It is necessary to assess θ M
and a of the allocator and the recipient based
on the choice behaviors in other decision mak-
ing situation other than the ultimatum games.
A methodology to assess θ M and a based on
the choice behaviors of a person in the decom-
posed game was proposed, and it was con-
firmed that θ M assessed by this method can
predict choice behaviors of a person in the
matrix games considerably?Doi, 2007?. This as-
sessment methodology utilizing decomposed
game is expected to be helpful for explaining
and predicting the choice behavior of the allo-
cators and the recipients in more detail.
The empirical research of the ultimatum
games shows that the allocators tend to pro-
pose the allocation given by point C, M, or D
in the experiment. They seldom propose the
allocation corresponding to point A or B. That
is, their allocation pattern seems to accord
with that shown in Fig.7. Some recipients tend
to refuse to receive the proposed allocation
where they could obtain 100% of the payoff,
that is, point B in XY space. The recipients
decision makings on acceptance of the pro-
posed allocation in empirical studies seem to
correspond to the acceptable area shown in
Fig.6. Therefore, the hybrid model of social ori-
entation seems to capture the characteristic
tendencies of decision making by the allocators
and the recipients, and it is expected to pro-
???? ????? ???????????? ?????? ?? ??? ???????????????
???????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?? ?? ??? ??
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mote the development of research on peoples
decisionmaking behavior in the ultimatum
games.
As shown previously, the hybrid model can
explain choice behavior of a person in the ma-
trix games considerably well?Doi, 2007?. The
classical geometrical model of social orientation
can explain choice behaviors of a person in the
matrix game fairly well, but it is incompetent
for the ultimatum games. The crucial defi-
ciency of the geometrical model is that it can-
not deal with equalityseeking motive of a per-
son. Since the hybrid model is an expansion of
the geometrical model, the hybrid model can
deal with any decision problem that the geo-
metrical model can deal with. In addition, the
hybrid model can deal with other decision
problems such as the ultimatum games that
the geometrical model is powerless to deal
with. Therefore, the hybrid model might give
a powerful research framework to investigate
peoples choice behavior in a variety of deci-
sion problems in the interdependent situations,
and is expected to promote the development
of research in this area.
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